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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Antipsychotic drugs “alter the chemical balance in a patient’s brain and can cause 
irreversible and fatal side effects.”1  Furthermore, they “act at all levels of the central 
nervous system as well as on multiple organ systems.  [They] can induce catatonic-
like states, alter electroencephalographic tracings, and cause swelling of the brain.  
Adverse reactions include drowsiness, excitement, restlessness, bizarre dreams, 
hypertension, nausea, vomiting, loss of appetite, salivation, dry mouth, perspiration, 
headache, constipation, blurred vision, impotency, eczema, jaundice, tremors, and 
muscle spasms.”2  As well as these symptoms, they can also cause “tardive 
dyskinesia, an often irreversible syndrome of uncontrollable movements that can 
prevent a person from exercising basic functions such as driving an automobile, and 
neuroleptic malignant syndrome, which is 30% fatal for those who suffer from it.  
The risk of side effects increases over time.”3  In light of these daunting risks, it is no 
                                                                
1Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 239 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
2Id. at 239-40. 
3Id. 
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surprise that the person faced with the risk of forced administration of these drugs 
stated that he would rather die than take them.4     
The Supreme Court of the United States recently decided whether the state act of 
forcibly administering these antipsychotic drugs to criminal defendants solely for 
trial competency purposes is constitutional.5  The Court previously held that the 
government could do so under certain circumstances, the most essential of which 
being that the person in custody pose a danger to himself or others.6  This present 
case, however, marked the first time the Court ruled on whether the government 
could administer the drugs solely to render the defendant competent to stand trial.7  
In the decision, the Court crafted a 4-prong test which the government would 
have to pass in order to forcibly administer the drugs.8  However, practically 
speaking, absent a showing of dangerousness, the delineated test will be difficult, if 
not impossible, to meet.  Unfortunately, since this question of dangerousness is the 
dispositive issue and the Court has continually failed to outline a clear standard of 
scrutiny to be applied, the individuals fundamental right to be free from unwanted 
antipsychotic medication remains in jeopardy, subject to less fundamental and 
compelling state interests.   
Part II of this note reviews the substance of the Sell decision, including the test it 
delineates.  It also reviews the paramount cases upon which Sell was decided.  Part 
III focuses on the different standards of scrutiny applied in each of those cases at the 
Supreme Court level, as well as the lower court’s invoked standards of scrutiny.  Part 
IV analyzes where the Court has left this doctrine in light of the Sell decision and 
why its effectiveness as a safeguard for an individual’s significant liberty interest in 
remaining free from unwanted antipsychotic medication is in serious jeopardy. 
II.  HISTORY OF CASES INVOLVING FORCED ADMINISTRATION OF ANTIPSYCHOTIC 
MEDICATION ON INDIVIDUALS 
A.  Sell v. United States 
The Sell decision dealt with a former dentist charged with submitting fictitious 
insurance claims for payment, which resulted in a grand jury indictment charging 
him with fifty-six counts of mail fraud, six counts of Medicaid fraud, and one count 
of money laundering.  A few months later, the grand jury issued another indictment 
charging Sell with attempted murder of an FBI agent and a former employee at his 
dental practice.  However, for purposes of his case in front of the Supreme Court, the 
charges of attempted murder were not an issue since they were not part of the 
original case.  This was significant in that it could have potentially weakened the 
                                                                
4Id. at 239. 
5Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). 
6Harper, 494 U.S. at 226. 
7In a related case to Sell, the Court was presented with a question of whether it was 
constitutional to forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs to a defendant to render him 
competent to stand trial.  However, the Court overturned the lower court’s conviction due to a 
lack of findings showing the defendant fell within the contours of the Harper test, not on the 
grounds of the practice being unconstitutional.  Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992). 
8Sell, 539 U.S. at 180-81. 
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government interest in prosecuting him, since fraud charges are traditionally viewed 
as less serious than attempted murder charges and a finding of dangerousness is less 
likely. 
The first prong of the Sell test requires a court to “find that important 
governmental interests are at stake.”9  Generally speaking, this is always satisfied 
when the government is seeking to administer drugs to a criminal defendant.  By 
prosecuting him, the government is serving its role of protecting society’s basic need 
for human security.10   
While this interest in adjudication of the charges is always present, it can be 
mitigated by other factors.  For instance, an incompetent defendant who refuses to 
take medication voluntarily will be confined for a significant period of time.11  While 
this effect will not provide the per se equivalent benefit on society that adjudication 
of criminal charges would, it nonetheless confers some benefit to society by keeping 
potentially-criminal individuals off the streets.  Also, the government interest can be 
dissipated by the length of confinement a defendant will have already experienced as 
a result of refusing the drugs.12  Lastly, the government’s interest in adjudication is 
not an absolute one, as the government itself has a “concomitant, constitutionally 
essential interest in assuring that the defendant’s trial is a fair one.”13  Therefore, 
while the government always has a certified interest in adjudication of the charges 
against the defendant, that interest can be reduced by other factors. 
The second prong of the Sell test requires “the court [to] conclude that 
involuntary medication will significantly further those concomitant state interests.”14  
To satisfy this prong, the government must prove two things.  First, it must show that 
medication is “substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand trial.”15  
Second, it must show that the medication is “substantially unlikely to have side 
effects that will interfere significantly with the defendant’s ability to assist counsel in 
conducting a trial defense, thereby rendering the trial unfair.”16  Justice Kennedy 
pointed out the possible detrimental effects of the drugs on a defendant’s ability to 
receive a fair trial by altering his demeanor in the courtroom, thus prejudicing the 
presentation of his defense or leaving him unable or unwilling to assist his counsel in 
presenting a defense.17  Therefore, any administration of antipsychotic medication 
must avoid either of these side effects to pass this prong.   
The third prong of the Sell test requires the “court to conclude that involuntary 
medication is necessary to further those interests.”18  This requires the court to 
                                                                
9Id. at 180 [emphasis in original]. 
10Id. (citing Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135-36 (1992)). 
11Sell, 539 U.S. at 179; see also 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d). 
12Sell, 539 U.S. at 179. 
13Id.  
14Id. at 181 [emphasis in original]. 
15Id. 
16Id.; see also Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142-45. 
17Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142. 
18Sell, 539 U.S. at 181 [emphasis in original]. 
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consider alternatives, both substantive and procedural, to forcible administration of 
the drugs.  For substantive alternatives, while there is no consensus among the 
scientific community as to the effectiveness of alternatives to medication, the court 
must still consider them.19  Also, the court must consider procedural alternatives to 
forcible medication, such as court orders backed with the threat of a contempt 
finding.20  After consideration of these alternatives, the court must find that forcible 
medication is the only means by which the government can achieve its interests.   
The fourth prong of the Sell test requires that “the court must conclude that 
administration of the drugs is medically appropriate.”21  To satisfy this prong, the 
government must show that administration of the drugs is medically appropriate for 
each individual defendant and, moreover, his specific symptoms.22  This prong seeks 
to ensure that whatever side effects the defendant may suffer (and considering the 
available medications, dangerous side effects are very possible), they will be 
outweighed by the benefits available to the defendant. 
The Sell decision came more than a decade after the Court gave permission to the 
government to forcibly administer drugs to inmates who were found to be dangerous 
to themselves or others.23  However, Sell is distinguishable from these earlier cases 
because of the government interest involved: making the defendant competent to 
stand trial.24  This asserted government interest can be differentiated from the earlier 
cases authorizing forced medication because it lacks a characteristic which was a 
focal point of those earlier decisions: a finding that the defendant was dangerous. 
B.  Washington v. Harper 
In Harper, the Court was confronted with the question of whether the 
government could forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs to a prison inmate and 
under what circumstances it would be constitutional to do so.25  In resolving the 
issue, the Court held that an inmate’s right to be free from forced medication had to 
be viewed in light of “the State’s interest in prison safety and security.”26 
                                                                
19Id. (comparing “Brief for American Psychological Association as Amicus Curiae 10-14 
(finding nondrug therapies may be effective in restoring psychotic defendants to competence); 
but cf. Brief for American Psychiatric Association et al. as Amici Curiae 13-22 (alternative 
treatments for psychosis commonly not as effective as medication)”). 
20Id. 
21Id. [emphasis added]. 
22Id. 
23Harper, 494 U.S. 210. 
24Issue of Sell presented as “whether the Constitution permits the Government to 
administer antipsychotic drugs involuntarily to a mentally ill criminal defendant in order to 
render that defendant competent to stand trial for serious, but nonviolent crimes.”  Sell, 539 
U.S. at 170.  Issue of Harper presented as “whether a judicial hearing is required before the 
State may treat a mentally ill prisoner with antipsychotic drug against his will.”  Harper, 494 
U.S. at 213. 
25Harper, 494 U.S. at 213. 
26Id. at 223. 
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Harper dealt with a prison inmate who was originally convicted of robbery in 
1976.  Until 1980, he spent most of his time in the mental health unit of the 
Washington State Penitentiary, where he voluntarily took the prescribed 
antipsychotic medication, but eventually refused to continue taking it.27  His treating 
physician then sought to forcibly administer the drugs pursuant to state policy.28  The 
policy required that a psychiatrist determine whether an inmate should be medicated 
with antipsychotic drugs.  If the inmate refused to consent, he could only be 
“subjected to involuntary treatment with the drugs if he (1) suffers from a ‘mental 
disorder’ and (2) is ‘gravely disabled’ or poses a ‘likelihood of serious harm’ to 
himself, others, or their property.”29 
Under the state policy, “gravely disabled” was summarily defined as a condition 
in which a person was in danger of harming himself due to an inability to care for his 
health and safety, or manifested serious deterioration in either cognitive or volitional 
functioning and was a threat to lose control of the ability to care for himself as a 
result.  More importantly, likelihood of serious harm was defined as a  
substantial risk that harm will be inflicted by an individual upon his own 
person, as evidenced by threats or attempts to commit suicide or inflict 
physical harm on one’s self, a substantial risk that physical harm will be 
inflicted by an individual upon others, as evidenced by behavior which 
has caused such harm or which places another person or persons in 
reasonable fear of sustaining such harm, or a substantial risk that physical 
harm will be inflicted by an individual upon property of others, as 
evidenced by behavior which has caused substantial loss or damage to the 
property of others.30   
Under this standard, the lower courts found that Harper posed a threat to himself 
or to others,31 and the Court agreed with their findings. 
The Court recognized that the inmate had a “right to be free from the arbitrary 
administration of antipsychotic medication.”32  Further, the Court recognized that the 
inmate possessed this right under both state law and the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.33  However, in regard to the inmate’s right under state law, 
this interest against unwanted medication was not absolute, and could be violated in 
                                                                
27Id. at 214. 
28Id.  The physician sought the medication under state policy SOC [Special Offender 
Center].  SOC Policy 600.30. 
29Harper, 494 U.S. at 215. 
30Id. at 216 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE §71.05.020(3)). 
31Harper, 494 U.S. at 217-18.  The district court held that the procedures contained in the 
state policy met the requirements previously prescribed by the Court in Vitek v. Jones, 445 
U.S. 480 (1980), and therefore could be implemented despite the petitioner’s recognized 
liberty interest. 
32Harper, 494 U.S. at 221. 
33Id. at 221-22. 
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furtherance of a state interest.34  In the context of his right to avoid unwanted 
medication under the Due Process Clause, the right was again found non-absolute, 
and it could be violated if a state met the rigors of due process, which the 
Washington Policy was found to do.35 
In formulating its decision, the Court relied heavily on the state interest involved: 
the interest in prison safety and security.36  It found that this specific interest carried 
with it vast significance.37  With the magnitude of the state interest involved in mind, 
the Court found that, “given the requirements of the prison environment, the Due 
Process Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental 
illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself 
or others and the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.”38  The Court found 
that by only treating dangerous inmates and only under circumstances in which it 
was in their medical interests did the Washington State Policy meet these 
requirements.39  Retrospectively, it is reasonable to conclude that the two most 
important facets of this decision were the setting a prison environment and the fact 
that the inmate was adjudged ‘dangerous’.  In the line of cases that follows, these 
characteristics serve to distinguish Harper. 
C.  Riggins v. Nevada 
The Court again faced the issue of forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs 
two years after Harper was decided.40  The posture of this case is more closely 
analogous to that of Sell because the government sought to medicate forcibly the 
                                                                
34
“By permitting a psychiatrist to treat an inmate with antipsychotic drugs against his 
wishes only if he is found to be (1) mentally ill and (2) gravely disabled or dangerous, the 
policy creates a justifiable expectation on the part of the inmate that the drugs will not be 
administered [arbitrarily].”  Id. at 221. 
35The policy under review requires the state to establish, by a medical finding, that a 
mental disorder exists which is likely to cause harm if not treated.   
Moreover, the fact that the medication must first be prescribed by a psychiatrist, and 
then approved by a reviewing psychiatrist, ensures that the treatment in question will 
be ordered only if it is in the prisoner’s medical interests, given the legitimate needs of 
his institutional confinement.  These standards, which recognize both the prisoner’s 
medical interests and the State’s interests, meet the demands of the Due Process 
Clause.   
Id. at 222-23. 
36Id. at 223 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), and O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 
482 U.S. 342 (1987)). 
37
“There can be little doubt as to both the legitimacy and the importance of the 
governmental interest presented here.  There are few cases in which the State’s interest in 
combating the danger posed by a person to both himself and others is greater than in a prison 
environment, which, ‘by definition,’ is made up of persons with ‘a demonstrated proclivity for 
antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct.’”  Harper, 494 U.S. at 225 (quoting Hudson v. 
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984)). 
38Harper, 494 U.S. at 227. 
39Id. 
40Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992). 
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defendant for purposes of rendering him competent to stand trial.41  However, 
contrary to Sell, the Nevada Supreme Court authorized forced medication before the 
defendant’s appeal was heard, and he was convicted as a result of his medicated 
competence.  In resolving the issue, the Court held that the conviction was tainted, 
but not because any of the defendant’s liberty interests were violated, but because the 
Nevada State Courts failed to make findings sufficient to support that conclusion.42 
David Riggins was arrested and charged with murder in late 1987.  Soon after 
being arrested, it was apparent to treating physicians that he was suffering from 
mental health problems.  He was treated with antipsychotic medications for the next 
few months at gradually increasing dosages.43  Finally, in early 1988, Riggins 
successfully moved for a competence hearing.  Riggins was interviewed by three 
court-appointed psychiatrists, two of whom found him competent to stand trial, and 
the District Court ruled him so competent.   
The defendant further moved the District Court to suspend administration of the 
drugs, claiming they interfered with his ability to present an insanity defense and 
they would further interfere with his ability to assist counsel under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.44  The District Court heard testimony from three different 
psychiatrists in deciding Riggins’ motion.  Of the three, two predicted that Riggins 
would likely be competent to stand trial without medication.  The third testified that 
he could not predict what the effects of taking the defendant off medication would 
produce, but added that the medication actually put him in a more relaxed state 
(however, the excessive dosage he was currently on may not have been necessary).45  
A fourth psychiatrist submitted an affidavit stating his belief that Riggins was 
incompetent to stand trial even with the current medication and that taking him off of 
it would likely lead him back to his “manifest psychosis and [make him] extremely 
difficult to manage.”46  
Subsequently, the District Court ruled against Riggins’ motion to terminate his 
medication in a one-page order that “gave no indication of the court’s rationale.”47  
Afterwards, Riggins continued on this high dosage48 of medication through trial, 
where he was convicted of murder after presenting his insanity defense.  Riggins 
appealed his conviction and sentencing to the Nevada Supreme Court, but was 
denied relief.  The Court held that expert testimony to the jury adequately informed it 
                                                                
41Id. at 133 (stating issue as “whether forced administration of antipsychotic medication 
during trial violated rights guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments”). 
42Id. at 129. 
43Id. 
44Id. at 130. 
45Id. at 130-31. 
46Id. at 131. 
47Id. 
48
“Dr. O’Gorman suggested that the dosage administered to Riggins was within the toxic 
range and could make him ‘uptight.’  Dr. Master testified that a patient taking 800 milligrams 
of Mellaril each day might suffer from drowsiness or confusion.”  Id. at 137 (citations 
omitted). 
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of the potential prejudicial effects of Mellaril, curing any possibility of error in the 
judgment.49 
In overturning the conviction, the Nevada Supreme Court primarily relied on the 
lack of adequate findings by the District Court regarding the necessity of forced 
administration.  “Because the record contains no finding that might support a 
conclusion that administration of antipsychotic medication was necessary to 
accomplish an essential state policy, we have no basis for saying that the substantial 
probability of trial prejudice in this case was justified.”50  Although it framed the 
issue as whether the forced administration of medication violated Riggins’ right to a 
fair trial, the Court ostensibly avoided the question.  Instead, the Court held that the 
State had simply not met its burden of proof to show that the medication was 
necessary, in light of the violation of Riggins liberty interest to be free from 
unwanted medication. 
In reaching its decision, the Court found that the State “certainly would have 
satisfied due process if the prosecution had demonstrated, and the District Court had 
found, that treatment with antipsychotic medication was medically appropriate and, 
considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of Riggins’ own safety 
or the safety of others.” 51  While the Court found that Riggins’ liberty interest in 
being free of unwanted medication could have been permissibly violated under due 
process with a showing by the State similar to that required in Harper, it also 
intimated that weaker state interests could lead to non-voluntary medication, such as 
lack of alternatives for adjudication of criminal charges52 (i.e., to render the 
defendant competent to stand trial to face his charges).  However, this statement is 
properly viewed as dicta since the Court held for the defendant based on the 
inadequate findings of the Nevada courts.  Nonetheless, although merely dicta, the 
Court’s intimation of lower standards by which to allow forced medication comports 
with its ultimately imperfect treatment of the issue in Sell, which asks when it is 
permissible for lower courts to authorize such forced medication and what standard 
should be applied to claims against the medication.   
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW AND LEVEL OF SCRUTINY 
APPLIED BY VARYING COURTS 
Substantive due process claims have traditionally received varied levels of 
scrutiny when Courts decide if State actions are justified in light of the right 
implicated.  In theory, most substantive due process liberty claims come under one of 
two levels of review: strict scrutiny or rational basis review.53  The application of 
                                                                
49Id. at 132. 
50Id. at 138. 
51Id. at 135. 
52
“Similarly, the state might have been able to justify medically appropriate, involuntary 
treatment with the drug by establishing that it could not obtain an adjudication of Riggins’ 
guilt or innocence by using less intrusive means.  See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 
(1970) (Brennan, J. concurring).”  Id. 
53See Sheldon Gelman, ‘Life’ and ‘Liberty’: Their Original Meaning, Historical 
Antecedents, and Current Significance in the Debate Over Abortion Rights, 78 MINN. L. REV. 
585, 693 (1994) (noting that most substantive due process liberties receive rational basis 
review, while a few receive strict scrutiny). 
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either test usually depends on the nature of the right advanced.  If the right is found 
to be a fundamental one, it will receive strict scrutiny, but most non-fundamental 
rights receive the tempered rational review test.  However, some rights, which come 
under the purview of being fundamental, still receive a lower treatment than strict 
scrutiny.54  This standard of review is commonly referred to as intermediate, or 
heightened, scrutiny.   
Under the different standards, the importance of the state interest involved 
necessarily must vary with the scrutiny applied.  If the right is not a fundamental 
right, courts are usually very deferential because the basic requirement of the state 
action in that context is that it rationally reflect some public policy.55  However, if 
the right is a fundamental one, courts will tolerate only very little interference with 
the right, and the interference must be necessary to meet a compelling state interest.56  
In fact, classification as a fundamental right and implementation of the strict scrutiny 
test is sometimes referred to as “fatal in fact.”57  Furthermore, in the space between 
these two levels lies the intermediate scrutiny test, whose requirements continue to 
evolve and typically vary depending on the right and the state interest.  In this 
intermediate zone, essential state interests, that would normally be rejected under the 
strict scrutiny standard when in conflict with an individual’s fundamental liberty 
right, are able to find intermittent justification.58 
To resolve properly the issue of whether a state practice conflicts with an asserted 
liberty right of an individual, then, two preliminary questions must be answered: 
what exactly is the protected right asserted by the individual, and what is the state 
interest sought to be advanced through the government conduct?  While in theory, 
once the question of whether a right is fundamental is resolved (i.e., if it is found to 
be fundamental, the government conduct must meet the strict scrutiny standard and 
will likely fail to do so), in practice the state interest involved can sometimes work to 
assuage the importance of the fundamental right asserted by the defendant.  
Therefore, defining these two variables helps shape what level of scrutiny must be 
                                                                
54See Richard H. Fallon Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 315 (1993) (“not every restriction of a right 
classified as fundamental incurs ‘strict’ scrutiny”).  Fallon notes that fundamental rights such 
as marriage (Zablocki v. Redhail, (434 U.S. 374 (1978)), and the right to an abortion (Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, (505 U.S. 883 (1992)), have been protected by levels of scrutiny less 
than strict.  This transpiration is seen across a wide spectrum of constitutional liberties when 
the state manifests some act to infringe those liberties.    
55Id. 
56Id. 
57Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the (D)Evolution of Constitutional Doctrine, 30 
CONN. L. REV. 691, 694 (1998) (citing Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a 
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972)). 
58See Richard H. Fallon Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 317 (1993) (listing the various cases 
involving impinged liberty rights wherein “the Supreme Court has appeared to engage in an ad 
hoc balancing of ‘the liberty [interest] of the individual’ against ‘the demands of an organized 
society’”.  Such cases include confinement in mental institutions and the right to travel). 
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applied and whether the government interest is legitimate in light of the individual’s 
right sought to be protected.59 
A.  U.S. Supreme Court in Harper 
The Court in Harper reviewed the state conduct in question under a reasonable 
relation standard.  In doing so, the Court afforded considerable weight to the fact that 
the conduct in question was related to state penological interests.  By framing the 
issue60 in terms of the State’s legitimate interests in penological affairs, though, the 
Court significantly downplayed what is an accepted liberty interest of the prisoner.61  
While this test is not of the traditional reasonable relation standard,62 and could be 
considered more closely tailored to a rational relation with bite test, it is far from a 
strict scrutiny or heightened scrutiny standard traditionally afforded to fundamental 
liberty interests.  The overriding justification and reason for the outcome of the 
holding is the state interest invoked: the penological system. 
The Court’s focus on the particular state interest involved stems from its 
treatment of cases involving prisoner’s rights that face serious jeopardy in light of 
prison regulations enacted by the State.63  “The legitimacy, and the necessity, of 
considering the State’s interests in prison safety and security are well established by 
our cases.  In Turner v. Safley, and O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, we held that the 
proper standard for determining the validity of a prison regulation claimed to 
infringe on an inmate’s constitutional rights is to ask whether the regulation is 
‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’”64  Furthermore, the Court 
wrote that this is the proper test to apply “even when the constitutional right claimed 
to have been infringed is fundamental, and the State under other circumstances 
would have been required to satisfy a more rigorous standard of review.”65  
Therefore, the Court used precedent from cases in which non-fundamental rights are 
implicated (which would involve rationally related standards of review) to analyze 
cases in which fundamental rights are implicated66 (which, presumably, should 
                                                                
59Harper, 494 U.S. at 220 (‘“The substantive issue involves a definition of the protected 
constitutional interest, as well as identification of the conditions under which competing state 
interests might outweigh it.’”) (quoting Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982)). 
60
“The central question before us is whether a judicial hearing is required before the State 
may treat a mentally ill prisoner with antipsychotic drugs against his will.”  Harper, 494 U.S 
at 213 (working on the assumption that the State’s entitlement to administer such drugs in the 
first place necessarily downplays the significance of the liberty right asserted). 
61Id. at 221-22 (recognizing a prisoner’s significant liberty interest in avoiding the 
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under both state law and the Due Process 
Clause).  See generally Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982) (assuming that individuals have a 
constitutional liberty interest in avoiding unwanted medication and exploring the case law 
history of that assumption). 
62See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (reasonable 
relation essentially means any government interest will justify the action). 
63See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
64Harper, 494 U.S. at 223 (citations omitted).  
65Id. 
66See note 68, infra. 
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invoke a more stringent standard of review).  By focusing on the state interests 
involved (penological interests) as opposed to the defendant’s interest (liberty 
interest in being free of forced medication), the Court invoked a non-fundamental 
right standard of review. 
In articulating the scrutiny applied in matters involving penological interests, the 
Court reviewed the precedent from which this standard arose.  This review served to 
reinforce the history of reasonable relation with bite standard, but in making such a 
review, the Court again failed to consider exactly the right implicated, focusing 
instead on the state interests advanced.  Many of the rights, though certainly 
important, should not be put on a par with the right to be free from unwanted 
medication since that medication can fundamentally alter the composition of the 
person given the drugs.67  
The cases relied on by the Court to substantiate its reasonable relation with bite 
standard invoked important rights, but none involved an alteration of that prisoner’s 
being.68  In fact, the Washington Supreme Court refused to apply the reasonable 
relation standard of review and distinguished the Turner line of cases because 
Harper’s interest was distinguishable from the First Amendment rights asserted in 
those earlier cases.  It is, of course, somewhat speculative to try and determine which 
rights are more important, but the Court in Harper brushed off any consideration of 
the issue and lumped all the rights together. 
Instead of adopting a rule tailored to the individual rights asserted, the Court 
grouped all constitutionally asserted rights under one heading when in the face of 
penological state interests.69  In doing so, the Court concerned itself more with the 
possibility of a procedural due process violation, as opposed to a substantive due 
process violation, effectively glossing over the issue. “[T]he substantive issue is what 
factual circumstances must exist before the state may administer antipsychotic drugs 
to the prisoner against his will; the procedural issue is whether the state’s nonjudicial 
mechanisms used to determine the facts in a particular caser are sufficient.”70  
Couching the substantive issue in terms of what facts must exist before it is 
permissible to administer forcibly the drugs ignores the possibility of such 
administration being violative of the recipient’s right to bodily integrity.   
B.  Nevada Supreme Court in Riggins 
The Nevada Supreme Court, in reviewing Riggins’ appeal, held that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in continuing the forced administration of the 
                                                                
67See INTRODUCTION, supra, and note 68, infra. 
68See Turner, 482 U.S. 78 (prisoner’s right to marry); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ 
Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (right of prisoners’ union to organize and self-
govern); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (right to be interviewed by media and 
selection process imposed in media selections); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (right to 
single rooms, receive mail, procedures of shakedowns); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 
(1974) (right to uncensored mail and access to law students); O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 
482 U.S. 342 (1987) (right to exercise religious acts). 
69
“We made quite clear that the standard of review we adopted in Turner applies to all 
circumstances in which the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights.”  
Harper, 494 U.S. at 224. 
70Id. at 220. 
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antipsychotic drugs.71  Riggins claimed that the District Court abused its discretion 
since continuing administration of the drugs would prohibit Riggins from properly 
presenting his insanity defense.72  However, the Nevada Supreme Court held that 
administration of the drugs was not an abuse of discretion since Riggins could 
present expert testimony at trial to instruct the jury as to possible side effects of the 
drugs, and doing so would cure any prejudice.  By reaching this conclusion, the court 
implicitly adopted the reasonable relation standard because it never discussed the 
possibility that Riggins had some fundamental right against forced administration of 
the drugs which the State could only violate to meet some compelling consideration.    
In making these findings, the court relied on the findings of the District Court 
judge, which were embodied in “a one-page order that gave no indication of the 
court’s rationale.”73  In fact, the Supreme Court decision speculated that the District 
Court ordered the continued medication solely for fear that Riggins would otherwise 
become incompetent.  “Were we to divine the District Court’s logic from the hearing 
transcript, we would have to conclude that the court simply weighed the risk that the 
defense would be prejudiced by changes in Riggins’ outward appearance against the 
chance that Riggins would become incompetent if taken off Mellaril, and struck the 
balance in favor of involuntary medication.”74  The Court’s review of the Nevada 
Supreme Court decision confirmed the lower court’s application of the reasonable 
relation standard, since it approved administration of the drugs solely in order to try 
Riggins.  Although the Supreme Court itself speculated that this justification may be 
a sufficient enough reason to stick with the forced administration,75 it ultimately 
decided, as opposed to the Nevada Supreme Court, that the present findings are not 
compelling enough to continue the forced administration. 
One Nevada Supreme Court judge concurred in the decision, although he wrote 
separately to note that, in the future, criminal defendants in Riggins’ shoes should be 
taken off medication before trial to determine whether they would remain competent.  
If they reverted to incompetency, then-and only then-would re-administration of the 
drugs be appropriate.76  It appears this judge was comfortable with the reasonable 
relation standard but wished to add some bite to the procedural protections that come 
with it. 
Also, one Nevada Supreme Court Justice dissented, arguing that forced 
administration of antipsychotic drugs against criminal defendants was never 
appropriate to meet the State interest of adjudication of criminal charges.77  While it 
is unclear what level of review this Justice wished to implement, it is clear the 
reasonable relation standard was not sufficient. 
                                                                
71Riggins v. State, 808 P.2d 535 (Nev. 1991).  
72Id. at 537-38. 
73Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 131 (1992). 
74Id. at 137 (citing Record 502 (“[T]hat he was nervous and so forth . . . can all be brought 
out [through expert testimony].  And when you start weighing the consequences of taking him 
off his medication and possibly have him revert into an incompetent situation, I don’t think 
that that is a good experiment”). 
75See note 84, infra. 
76Riggins v. State, 808 P.2d at 539-40 (Rose, J., concurring). 
77Id. at 540-43 (Springer, J., dissenting). 
2003-04] UNITED STATES v. SELL 309 
C.  U.S. Supreme Court in Riggins 
The Court in Riggins failed to explicitly proscribe a substantive test.78  Based on 
that, it is unclear whether the Court would advocate a reasonable relation test or a 
heightened scrutiny test.  The Court essentially compared Riggins’ case to Harper’s, 
equating pretrial detainees with convicted prisoners.79  Based on that comparison, it 
would appear as though a rational relation with bite test would be invoked.80  
However, based on the language the Court used,81 such as “less intrusive 
alternatives” and ‘overriding justification’, the Court sketched a test more closely 
analogous to that of heightened scrutiny.82      
To pass the prescribed test, the State had to at least meet the test laid out in 
Harper in order to administer forcibly antipsychotic drugs to Riggins.  “Nevada 
certainly would have satisfied due process if the prosecution had demonstrated, and 
the District Court had found, that treatment with antipsychotic medication was 
medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the 
sake of Riggins’ own safety or the safety of others.”83  Nevada would have been able 
to administer the drugs if it had shown that Riggins presented a danger, or could 
have been coined a “dangerous” person (assuming the government could have met 
the threshold requirement of showing the medical appropriateness of the drugs.  
Riggins never challenged its appropriateness in court).  Under the reasonably related 
standard, this governmental interest sufficiently outweighed Riggins’ interest in 
freedom from bodily intrusion to make it constitutionally permissible to administer 
the drugs forcibly. 
Also significant was the next justification, which the Court suggested would have 
allowed Nevada to forcibly administer the drugs.  “Similarly, the State might have 
been able to justify medically appropriate, involuntary treatment with the drug by 
establishing that it could not obtain an adjudication of Riggins’ guilt or innocence by 
                                                                
78Riggins, 504 U.S. at 133-36.  
79Id. at 135 (“Under Harper, forcing antipsychotic drugs on a convicted prisoner is 
impermissible absent a finding of overriding justification and a determination of medical 
appropriateness.  The Fourteenth Amendment affords at least as much protection to persons 
the State detains for trial”); see also, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (“[P]retrial 
detainees, who have not been convicted of any crimes, retain at least those constitutional rights 
that we have held are enjoyed by convicted prisoners”). 
80As contrasted with note 62, supra, the traditional “anything goes” rational relation test. 
81See Riggins, 504 U.S. 135 (using language such as “forcing antipsychotic drugs on a 
convicted prisoner is impermissible absent a finding of overriding justification and a 
determination of medical appropriateness”; also commenting that Nevada may have satisfied 
their burden of proof had the District Court found “that treatment with antipsychotic 
medication was medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for 
the sake of Riggins’ own safety or the safety of others”).     
82See Comment, Balking at Buying What the Eighth Circuit is Sell-ing:  United States v. 
Sell, and the Involuntary Medication of Incompetent, Non-Dangerous, Pretrial Detainees 
Cloaked with the Presumption of Innocence, 71 UMKC L. REV. 685, 690-94 (2003). 
83Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135. 
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using less intrusive means.”84  This justification would move away from the 
previously accepted ones outlined in Harper (dangerousness of defendant or danger 
posed to those around him), because it would allow administration of drugs solely 
based on the government’s interest in adjudication of the case.   
Even assuming that some degree of scrutiny beyond reasonable relation is 
employed in these challenges, the Court’s dicta here adds strength to the state’s 
argument that it should be allowed to forcibly medicate individual’s in Riggins’ 
position, and would thus prevail under some form of heightened scrutiny.  The chief 
“less intrusive means” would likely be to stop medicating Riggins and try him, 
whether he is competent or not.  However, neither Riggins nor the State argued that 
he could be tried after cessation of the medication,85 if it rendered him incompetent, 
and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of prosecuting incompetents casts doubt on 
that possibility.86  Therefore, this dicta adds credence to the State’s argument for 
forced medication because no “less intrusive means” will result in adjudication of the 
case.   
The Court also took explicit exception to the dissent’s contention that it was 
adapting a strict scrutiny standard.87  Rather, it justified its holding on the grounds 
that the lower courts in Nevada failed to make any findings sufficient to meet the 
reasonable relation standard.  The Court noted that it did not have “occasion to 
finally prescribe such substantive standards as mentioned above, since the District 
Court allowed administration of Mellaril to continue without making any 
determination of the need for this course or any findings about reasonable 
alternatives.”88   
Rather than outlining the correct legal standard for forced administration of 
antipsychotic drugs to criminal defendants, the Court used the bare minimum 
requirements of the reasonable relation test in Harper (in which the defendant’s 
inmate status was so heavily relied upon), to establish that Nevada had not met those 
standards in the present case.  Essentially, the Court held that whatever the true 
standard may be, Nevada did not meet it here.  The Court overturned the Nevada 
decision because of a lack of findings as to what governmental interest was being 
submitted that would outweigh the defendant’s liberty interest.89  More, the Court 
                                                                
84Id. (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(“Constitutional power to bring an accused to trial is fundamental to a scheme of ‘ordered 
liberty’ and prerequisite to social justice and peace”)). 
85The Court noted that Riggins did not argue that he should have been allowed to refuse 
the medication and be tried, even if by refusal he was incompetent to stand trial.  Riggins, 504 
U.S. at 136.   
86
“[C]onviction of an incompetent defendant violates due process.”  Id. at 139 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966)). 
87
“Contrary to the dissent’s understanding, we do not ‘adopt a standard of strict scrutiny.’”  
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 136. 
88Id. 
89
“[W]e would have to conclude that the court simply weighed the risk that the defense 
would be prejudiced by changes in Riggins’ outward appearance against the chance that 
Riggins would become incompetent if taken off Mellaril, and struck the balance in favor of 
involuntary medication.”  Id. at 136. 
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noted that the lower court “did not acknowledge the defendant’s liberty interest in 
freedom from unwanted antipsychotic drugs.”90  Rather than clearly putting any teeth 
into the appropriate standard of review in forced antipsychotic administration cases, 
the Court found that Nevada simply failed to meet the toothless reasonable relation 
standard already in existence.91  
Justice Kennedy, author of the Court’s opinion in Harper, wrote a separate 
opinion concurring in the judgment in Riggins.92  Justice Kennedy’s primary concern 
with this case was his belief that antipsychotic drugs “pose[d] a serious threat to a 
defendant’s right to a fair trial.”93  He further noted his belief that “absent an 
extraordinary showing by the State, the Due Process Clause prohibits prosecuting 
officials from administering involuntary doses of antipsychotic medicines for 
purposes of rendering the accused competent for trial . . . and [I] doubt that showing 
can be made in most cases.”94   
Justice Kennedy’s reference to an “extraordinary showing” alludes to his 
acceptance of a higher standard than the reasonable relation standard that he 
authored in Harper.  He later distinguished Harper in his concurrence,95 noting that 
different rights were implicated.  What is unclear is whether Justice Kennedy’s 
reservations about the present administration of drugs stem more from the absence of 
a ‘dangerousness’ element in Riggins, or whether it is because this case implicates 
the rights of pre-trial criminal defendants, as opposed to already incarcerated 
individuals.  Whatever the motivating factor behind Justice Kennedy’s vote, it is 
clear that he advocates a higher standard of review in cases of forced administration 
of antipsychotic drugs to pre-trial criminal defendants when that defendant is not 
considered ‘dangerous’. 
D.  Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Sell 
In reviewing Sell’s appeal, the Eighth Circuit purported to adopt a heightened 
scrutiny standard of review but declined to accept Sell’s recommended strict scrutiny 
approach.96  While rejecting the magistrate’s findings that Sell was dangerous, both 
                                                                
90Id. at 137. 
91Throughout its opinion, the Court emphasized the fact that the District Court denied 
Riggins’ motion to terminate the medication in a one-page order which did not explain the 
court’s rationale whatsoever.  It was more this lack of explanation and findings that doomed 
Nevada, not the eventual impropriety of forced administration of antipsychotic drugs.   
92Riggins, 504 U.S. at 138-45. 
93Id. at 138. 
94Id. at 139. 
95
“This is not a case like Washington v. Harper in which the purpose of the involuntary 
medication was to ensure that the incarcerated person ceased to be a physical danger to 
himself or others . . . . Here the purpose of the medication is not merely to treat a person with 
grave psychiatric disorders and enable that person to function and behave in a way not 
dangerous to himself or others, but rather to render the person competent to stand trial.”  Id. at 
140 (citations omitted).   
96United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 567 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Like our sister courts, we 
believe that we must apply some sort of heightened standard of review, but unlike the Sixth 
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the district and appellate courts still came to the conclusion that forcible 
administration of drugs was appropriate because the state fulfilled the alluded-to 
criteria in the Riggins’ decision.  In so deciding, the Eighth Circuit relied heavily on 
the dicta in the Riggins decision, as the two were factually similar in so far as neither 
defendant was considered to be dangerous.  However, by adopting the dicta in 
Riggins as its holding, the Eighth Circuit ignored an essential element of the Court’s 
jurisprudence in forcible administration of medication; either the existence of a 
dangerous propensity in the defendant or a state interest in penological institutions.  
In framing the issue before it, the Eighth Circuit asked whether the district court 
was correct in authorizing forced administration of drugs simply for trial competence 
purposes.97  To answer this question, the court framed a three-prong test for the 
government to pass in order to forcibly administer the medication.   
Based on the Supreme Court decisions in Riggins and Harper . . . we hold 
that the government must meet the following test in order for the 
government to forcibly medicate an individual.  First, the government 
must present an essential state interest that outweighs the individual’s 
interest in remaining free from medication.  See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135 
(noting that the government must prove an overriding state interest). 
Second, the government must prove that there is no less intrusive way of 
fulfilling its essential interest.  See id. Third, the government must prove 
by clear and convincing evidence that the medication is medically 
appropriate.  See id. Medication is medically appropriate if: (1) it is likely 
to render the patient competent, see Weston, 255 F.3d at 876; (2) the 
likelihood and gravity of side effects do not overwhelm its benefits, see 
id.; and (3) it is in the best medical interests of the patient.  See Harper, 
494 U.S. at 227 (noting that the court should consider the petitioner's 
medical interest).98   
Further, the court stated that the district court failed to analyze the case under this 
test, so it would review the court’s findings to determine if the government had 
fulfilled its burden of proof.99   
Under the first prong, the court held that the government had a significant interest 
in adjudication of the charges against Sell.100  The court recognized, however, that 
not all charges would be serious enough to justify such an intrusion of one’s liberty.  
Rather, the charges must be serious in nature.101  Then, in a cursory manner, the court 
                                                          
Circuit, we do not adopt the strict scrutiny standard”) (citing United States v. Weston, 255 
F.3d 873, 888 (D.C. Cir. 2001) and United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947 (6th Cir. 1998)). 
97Sell, 282 F.3d at 562. 
98Id. at 567. 
99Id. at 567-68. 
100Id. at 568 (“The government has an essential interest in brining a defendant to trial”) 
(citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
101The seriousness of the charges that would qualify a defendant for forced administration 
of drugs is the principal point of dissent by Judge Bye.  Charges of a more serious nature, such 
as murder or attempted murder (e.g., Weston, 225 F.3d at 881) are what that Judge thought the 
Supreme Court was alluding to when it outlined the test to which the present court was 
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decided that Sell’s present charges were serious enough to override his significant 
liberty interest in being free of medication.102   
In deciding whether there were any less intrusive means by which to meet the 
essential government interest outlined above, the court found that without restoring 
Sell to competence, the government could not try him on these serious charges.103  
The court further noted that Sell’s psychiatrist even admitted that no remedy for 
returning Sell to competence existed outside administration of the drugs.104  
Although this conclusion is not wholly unreasonable, the court failed to consider 
other alternatives available to the government, for instance court orders to take the 
medication backed by a threat of contempt.105  Perhaps if the court had followed this 
course, Sell would have eventually consented to the medication, thus providing the 
state the opportunity to prosecute him and at the same time allowing Sell to retain 
some dignity by not having these powerful drugs injected forcibly, but rather injected 
by way of a conscious choice.  Instead, though, the court makes another cursory 
conclusion that the only way to adjudicate Sell is to administer drugs, forcibly or not.     
The third prong required the government to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the medication was medically appropriate, by ensuring that it would 
likely restore competence, that the side effects likely would not outweigh the 
benefits, and that it was in the best medical interests of the patient.106  In deciding 
this issue, the court noted that both parties presented considerable expert testimony at 
trial supporting each one’s view.107  Despite the differing points of view, though, the 
                                                          
purporting to adhere.  Money laundering and fraud charges are not what he thought the Court 
had in mind.  
102Sell 282 F.3d at 568.  The court stated its belief that not all charges would be serious 
enough to warrant forced medication.  However, it stated that the present charges are serious 
enough.  It is unclear from the opinion whether the court reached this conclusion based on the 
nature of the charges (fraud and money-laundering) or whether the court relied on the quantity 
of the charges (62 charges of fraud and one charge of money-laundering).  While it’s possible 
the court could have viewed fraud and money-laundering as serious enough to merit forced 
medication, the more reasonable conclusion is that the court viewed the volume of the charges 
as the dispositive factor.  Without more elaboration, though, it’s impossible to tell.  Reliance 
on such a factor sets a dangerous precedent for future overly-zealous prosecutors seeking to 
create a synthetically competent defendant and to give him every incentive to ‘throw the book’ 
at the person in custody.  The more charges they can eventually add, the better chance the 
government would have of medicating a defendant forcibly, even absent a dangerousness 
element in the person’s character.   
103Id. 
104Id. (“Even Dr. Cloninger, who submitted an affidavit on behalf of Sell and stated that 
antipsychotic drugs are not a proven treatment, did not suggest any alternative means of 
restoring competency”). 
105Perhaps this idea was not proposed prior to the Supreme Court Sell decision, but it is 
one specifically adopted by the Court upon review. 
106Id. at 567. 
107The government presented two witnesses to show the medication to be appropriate.  The 
first, Dr. DeMier, was Sell’s treating psychologist.  He stated that antipsychotic medication 
was the only means by which to restore Sell to competency and that he previously treated two 
patients with such medication, one of whom was effectively restored (with the other not 
regaining competence, but “improving”).  Dr. DeMier also acknowledged that serious side 
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court stated “we do not believe that the district court committed clear error in finding 
that the government proved medical appropriateness by clear and convincing 
evidence.”108  Rather than submitting its own belief on the appropriateness of the 
medication under its prescribed test, the court relied on a deferential view that the 
lower court did not commit reversible error,109 reminiscent of the Riggins holding 
where the Court found that Nevada simply hadn’t met their burden of proof.  Instead 
of relying on this deferential review, the court could have performed a more exacting 
review of the record to determine whether the medication was in fact appropriate. 
In sum, the Eighth Circuit facially applied a heightened scrutiny test.  The test it 
outlines would be one of heightened scrutiny, yet Sell lost his appeal.  In reaching its 
conclusion, the court relied heavily on the lack of any reasonable alternatives 
towards adjudication of the case against Sell.  Due to its heavy reliance on the state 
interest of adjudication of the case against Sell, the court underestimated the 
significance of Sell’s liberty interest to be free from unwanted medication; this 
approach is similar to the Court’s tunneled-view in Harper of the overriding need for 
penological safety, when compared to the inmate’s fundamental right to be free from 
unwanted medication.   
A true heightened scrutiny standard would accord greater weight to the 
defendant’s interest to be free from medication, and require more state interest than 
the dire need of the government to adjudicate such serious charges as fraud and 
money-laundering.  Furthermore, it would require a far greater showing by the 
government of the third prong of its own test: that the medication was truly 
appropriate.  While it creates a number of sub-categories through which the 
government could carry its clear and convincing burden of proof, a generous reading 
of the record shows that both sides presented credible evidence from which a 
conclusion supporting Sell’s, or the government’s, argument could legitimately be 
drawn.   Therefore, while called a heightened scrutiny standard, the Eighth Circuit’s 
test should be viewed more as a reasonably related with bite standard.   
E.  U.S. Supreme Court in Sell 
The Court in Sell effectively adopted a heightened scrutiny standard of review for 
forced administration of antipsychotic drugs for pre-trial criminal defendants who 
are not dangerous.  Without explicitly adopting this standard, the Court in effect did 
so.  Reviewing the history of both Harper and Riggins, the Court stated that it would 
                                                          
effects could occur as a result of the medication (see INTRODUCTION, supra).  Dr. Wolfson, a 
psychiatrist who treated Sell, also testified that three out of four patients he had treated with 
antipsychotic medication were restored to competency.  Dr. Wolfson too acknowledged that 
patients could develop serious side effects from the medication, namely sedation, neuroleptic 
malignant syndrome, tardive dyskinesia, and dystonic reaction.  In response, Sell presented 
two witnesses who testified that there existed no evidence that use of antipsychotic medication 
was effective for treatment of Sell’s symptoms.  Both witnesses admitted, though, that they 
could not recommend any better forms of medication, which the Eighth Circuit stressed in its 
ruling. 
108Id. at 570. 
109Id. at 570-71. 
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be constitutionally permissible to administer psychotropic drugs forcibly, but only in 
limited circumstances.110   
The Court found that forced administration of the drugs would be appropriate 
only if: (1) important governmental interests are at stake; (2) involuntary medication 
will significantly further those government interests; (3) involuntary medication is 
necessary to further those governmental interests; and (4) administration of the drugs 
is medically appropriate.111   
The Court emphasized that this test should only be employed when the State is 
seeking to forcibly medicate the defendant solely for trial competence purposes.112  
The Court encouraged lower courts [before administering this Sell-test] to administer 
different tests for forced administration, namely Harper-type tests to render a 
dangerous person non-dangerous.113  If nothing else, the Court held, the findings of 
these different tests will provide answers on the ultimate ‘administration solely for 
competence’ test the Court presently advocates.114  Further, by requiring lower courts 
to consider alternatives, the Court is sending a message that less intrusive means 
should at least be considered. 
In deciding the present case, the Court relied heavily on the District Court 
findings, and the ultimate agreement with those findings by the Appellate Court, that 
Sell was not dangerous.115  Grudgingly accepting these findings, the Court found that 
forced administration solely for trial competence purposes was impermissible.  
However, this holding is more analogous to the Riggins decision, where the Court 
found a lack of justifiable lower court findings to administer the drugs, rather than an 
outright violation of Sell’s liberty interest. 
[W]e must assume that Sell was not dangerous.  And on that hypothetical 
assumption, we find that the Court of Appeals was wrong to approve 
forced medication solely to render Sell competent to stand trial.  For one 
thing, the Magistrate’s opinion makes clear that he did not find forced 
                                                                
110Sell, 539 U.S. at 180 (“This standard will permit involuntary administration of drugs 
solely for trial competence purposes in certain instances.  But those instances may be rare”).   
111Id. at 180-81. 
112Id. at 181-82. 
113Id. (“A court need not consider whether to allow forced medication for [trial 
competence only], if forced medication is warranted for a different purpose such as the 
purposes set out in Harper related to the individual’s dangerousness, or purposes related to the 
individual’s own interests where refusal to take drugs puts his health gravely at risk.  There are 
often strong reasons for a court to determine whether the forced administration of drugs can be 
justified on these alternative grounds before turning to the trial competence question”) 
(emphasis in original). 
114Id. at 183 (“Even if a court decides medication cannot be authorized on the alternative 
grounds, the findings underlying such a decision will help to inform expert opinion and 
judicial decisionmaking in respect to a request to administer drugs for trial competence 
purposes”). 
115Sell, 539 U.S. at 184 (“We shall assume that the Court of Appeals’ conclusion about 
Sell’s dangerousness was correct.  But we make that assumption only because the Government 
did not contest, and the parties have not argued, that particular matter.  If anything the record 
before us, described in Part I, suggests the contrary.”) (emphasis in original).  
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medication legally justified on trial competence grounds alone.  Rather, 
the Magistrate concluded that Sell was dangerous, and he wrote that 
forced medication was “the only way to render the defendant not 
dangerous and competent to stand trial.”116 
The Court in Sell did adopt a heightened scrutiny standard, making it more 
difficult for the State to forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs.  It creates a narrow 
window of forced administration, but only when the defendant in question is not a 
dangerous person.  Further, by painstakingly pointing out that for purposes of the 
present case, the Court was acting on the ‘hypothetical assumption’ that Sell was not 
a dangerous person, the Court weakens its resolve in forbidding this practice.   
Of these five different cases in five different courts, only the most recent case at 
the Supreme Court applied anything that truly resembled a heightened scrutiny 
standard.  With that being said, the shame of Sell is that heightened scrutiny applies 
very narrowly, with a group of loopholes allowing the government to get back closer 
to the rational review with bite standards.   
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Dangerousness as the Dispositive Element and Chief Loophole 
While the Supreme Court’s opinion in Sell facially makes it more difficult for the 
government to administer drugs forcibly to a certain class of individuals, the 
practical effect of the ruling will be limited.117  In fact, the effect of the opinion will 
be just that: provide protection to a narrow group of individuals (non-dangerous, pre-
trial detainees refusing to accept medication who are not charged with a violent 
crime) under a narrow set of circumstances.  The main impetus for this phenomenon 
of limited protection is the Court’s distinction between dangerous and non-dangerous 
individuals.118  Furthermore, the Court does not proscribe any test for lower courts to 
use when trying to decide a person’s dangerousness.119  Inapposite to such a standard, 
the Court leaves it within the discretion of the lower courts to decide whether a 
person is dangerous.120   
                                                                
116Id. at 185 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
117The Court itself acknowledged this will be the case since it carefully framed the issue as 
“Whether the Constitution permits the Government to administer antipsychotic drugs 
involuntarily to a mentally ill criminal defendant—in order to render that defendant competent 
to stand trial for serious, but nonviolent, crimes.”  Sell, 539 U.S. at 169.  In fact, the Court 
answered this question affirmatively, albeit with pretty strict limitations.  More significant 
than the affirmative response, though, is the narrowness of the rule.  Government agencies 
should be able to distinguish easily this fact pattern by showing that a defendant is in fact 
dangerous, or maybe even simply by showing that the charges the individual faces are more 
serious than money laundering and fraud.  Unfortunately, it is not clear to what extent this 
effective prohibition will stretch to.   
118Harper, 494 U.S. at 216. 
119Each jurisdiction will have a different test or measurement to determine a person’s 
“dangerousness,” but a typical example can be seen in note 30, supra.  Moreover, a federal test 
would eventually have to be prescribed, at least to be applied in federal jurisdictions. 
120
“We shall assume that the Court of Appeals’ conclusion about Sell’s dangerousness was 
correct.  But we make that assumption only because the Government did not contest, and the 
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The importance of this dangerousness question cannot be overstated.  Much as 
application of strict scrutiny is often ‘fatal in fact,’121 the question of whether a 
person is found dangerous will also likely be dispositive of the adjudication of a 
case.  First, the Court notes that before adjudication of forced administration on the 
grounds presented in Sell whether to forcibly medicate a person solely for trial 
competence purposes is presented, the Court advised that lower courts should ask 
whether forced medication can be justified on other grounds.122  Only after finding 
that the individual cannot justifiably be medicated due to his ‘dangerousness’ should 
the court consider whether it be permissible it to medicate for trial competence 
purposes.  Therefore, faced with a gaping loophole in the Court’s heightened 
scrutiny against forcible medication, government agencies will likely do all they can 
to show that a defendant is in fact ‘dangerous,’ thereby circumventing the Court’s 
stricter version of the test and forcibly medicating the individual on these 
“alternative grounds.”123  To gauge properly the variety by which future lower courts 
may reach this dispositive dangerousness question, a review of applicable lower 
court findings is appropriate. 
The dangerousness findings in Sell resulted from his relationship with a nurse at 
the hospital he was confined in.  Essentially, Sell fell in love with the nurse and 
became infatuated with her.124  There were further facts about Sell making threats 
against witnesses who planned to testify against him, but this became a moot point 
once Sell was confined in the medical center.  Therefore, all dangerousness findings 
presented to the courts were based on this infatuation with a nurse.     
Throughout the litigative course of Sell, a total of fourteen judges reviewed the 
case.125  Of these judges, at least three clearly found that Sell was not dangerous; the 
district court judge and two of the appellate court judges stated so.126  On the other 
                                                          
parties have not argued, that particular matter.  If anything, the record before us, described in 
Part I, suggests the contrary.”  Sell, 539 U.S. at 184.  Justice Breyer’s reluctance to accept the 
dangerousness findings of the district and appellate courts will only muddy the waters for 
future determination of ‘dangerousness’ findings.   
121Fallon, supra note 58. 
122
“A court need not consider whether to allow forced medication for that kind of purpose, 
if forced medication is warranted for a different purpose such as the purposes set out in 
Harper related to individual’s dangerousness, or purposes related to the individual’s own 
interests where refusal to take drug puts his health gravely at risk.  There are often strong 
reasons for a court to determine whether forced administration of drugs can be justified on 
these alternative grounds before turning to the trial competence question.”  Sell, 539 U.S. at 
181-82. 
123Id. at 182. 
124Id. at 172-73 (“In July 1999, Sell had approached one of the Medical Center’s nurses, 
suggested that he was in love with her, criticized her for having nothing to do with him, and 
when told that his behavior was inappropriate, added, ‘I can’t help it.’”) (citations omitted).  
Doctors testifying about this incident concluded that it was unlikely that behavior like Sells’ in 
this instance would stop anytime soon and, on that basis, decided he was ‘dangerous’ even 
within the institution. 
125Id.; United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2002). 
126Sell, 539 U.S. at 174 (“The majority [of the Court of Appeals] affirmed the District 
Court’s determination that Sell was not dangerous.  The majority noted that, according to the 
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hand, at least two, and ostensibly seven, judges found Sell to be dangerous.  The 
magistrate judge originally authorizing the forced medication clearly stated so,127 and 
Justice Breyer wrote that “the record before us, described in Part I, suggests that 
[Sell was dangerous].”128  The fact that Justice Breyer wrote the opinion of the Court, 
in which Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Souter, Rehnquist, and Stevens silently 
agreed, suggests that all those Justices would have found Sell to be dangerous.  
Furthermore, Justices Scalia, O’Connor, and Thomas dissented in the opinion129 
(albeit on jurisdictional grounds), but one must suspect they would be inclined to 
give great deference to a dangerousness finding by lower courts.  Therefore, even 
under the announced requirements of Sell authorizing forced administration of drugs 
on non-dangerous individuals, the Justices writing the opinion would have applied it 
differently in their own case, finding him dangerous and forcibly medicating him on 
those grounds.130 
In Harper, the Court found that the defendant was in fact dangerous.  The 
defendant in that case had previously assaulted two nurses.131 All judges reviewing 
the case in the Washington judicial system agreed that Harper was in fact dangerous.  
On the Supreme Court, a majority agreed that Harper was dangerous.  This finding is 
more reasonable than that reached in Sell since it involved physical acts of violence.  
However, even under this holding, review of the particular acts of violence leading to 
the “dangerous” designation should be reviewed carefully.   
In Riggins, the issue of Riggins’ level of dangerousness was not directly litigated 
and was in fact the reason for the Nevada Court reversal.132  Had the State brought 
any evidence to show that Riggins was in fact dangerous or posed a threat of 
danger,133 he would likely have been forcibly medicated.134  If nothing else, this 
                                                          
District Court, Sell’s behavior at the Medical Center amounted at most to an ‘inappropriate 
familiarity and even an infatuation with a nurse’.  The Court of Appeals agreed, ‘[u]pon 
review,’ that ‘the evidence does not support a finding that Sell posed a danger to himself or 
others at the Medical Center.”) (citations omitted). 
127Id. at 185 (“[T]he Magistrate’s opinion makes clear that he did not find forced 
medication legally justified on trial competence grounds alone.  Rather, the Magistrate 
concluded that Sell was dangerous, and he wrote that forced medication was ‘the only way to 
render the defendant not dangerous and competent to stand trial’”) (citations omitted). 
128Id. at 184.   
129Id. at 186-93. 
130The equivalent of Sell’s dangerous conduct would be asking someone out on a date.  Cf. 
note 124.  While it may have made the nurse uncomfortable and certainly could be described 
as inappropriate, basing a finding of a person being ‘dangerous’ which ultimately results in 
that person being forcibly administered antipsychotic medication with a (albeit slim) chance of 
death, hardly seems justified.   
131Harper, 494 U.S. at 214. 
132Riggins, 504 U.S. at 127. 
133For instance, becoming infatuated with a prison guard. 
134Riggins, 504 U.S. at 138 (“Because the record contains no finding that might support a 
conclusion that administration of antipsychotic medication was necessary to accomplish an 
essential state policy, however, we have no basis for saying that the substantial probability of 
trial prejudice in this case was justified”).  
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highlights the dispositive effect of a dangerousness determination.  Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion does not rule out that Riggins could have been medicated had he 
been found dangerous or if the charges against him were serious enough to warrant 
it.135  Further, Justice Kennedy specifically distinguished Harper, where he found 
that the forced administration was primarily justified due to dangerousness, and left 
that standing in good form.136  Since Sell, though, now someone in Riggins’ situation 
faces a possibility of being forcibly medicated even absent a showing of present 
dangerousness if they committed a “violent crime.”137   
In cases decided since Sell was handed down, the murky waters haven’t appeared 
to clear up yet.  In United States v. Kourey,138 a court found that grounds existed to 
forcibly medicate the defendant on Harper-type grounds,139 as he posed a threat.  The 
court reached these findings based on the physical appearance of the defendant at a 
competency hearing and the testimony of a psychiatrist who cursorily found the 
defendant to pose a threat.  Similarly, in United States v. Colon,140 a court relied on 
the findings of a psychiatrist who found the defendant dangerous.  The psychiatrist 
based these findings on the nature of the defendant’s mental illness, but not on any 
specific instances of violence or acts presenting dangerous tendencies.141    
That these two lower court opinions failed to authorize forced medication 
highlights the uncertainty of this area of law.  Even though the courts found 
justifiable reasons for forcibly medicating the respective defendants, they declined to 
take such action.  Instead, they relied on Sell’s recommendation that other courses of 
action be taken before the government may forcibly medicate.  Whether these 
holdings ultimately result in the defendant being medicated or not is unclear, and is 
in fact one of the problems with Sell.  It leaves lower courts and government 
agencies with alternatives to forced medication,142 but many government agencies 
                                                                
135Id. at 127-28 (“Due process certainly would have been satisfied had the State shown 
that the treatment was medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, 
essential for Riggins’ own safety or the safety of others . . . . However, the trial court allowed 
the drug’s administration to continue without making any determination of the need for this 
course or any findings about reasonable alternatives, and it failed to acknowledge Riggins’ 
liberty interest in freedom from antipsychotic drugs.”) 
136Id. at 138-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
137Riggins was convicted of murder and robbery, and Sell specifically applies to non-
violent offenses only.   
138United States v. Kourey, 276 F. Supp. 2d 580 (S.D.W.Va. 2003). 
139Even though the court found these grounds to exist, the court deferred such 
administration on procedural grounds, rather than on substantive due process grounds.  Id. 
140United States v. Colon, 2003 WL 21730603 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 21, 2003). 
141Even though this court found the defendant to be dangerous, it ordered the parties in the 
case to proceed down other avenues before it would consent to forcibly medicating the 
individual.  Id. 
142When the government is trying to forcibly medicate an individual, the court can first 
threaten the defendant with a finding of contempt if he refuses to take voluntarily the 
medication; the court can also formally commit the defendant (which, in Justice Blackmun’s 
opinion, was the proper thing to do.  See Harper, 494 U.S. at 236-37 (Blackmun, J., 
concurring)).   
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and lower courts will not want to deal with these delays.  Instead, to save time, these 
agencies and courts may go right for adjudication of the case through obtaining 
synthetic competence of the defendant, which, after Sell, they are permitted to do 
once they establish an individual’s dangerousness.   
Based on the holding in Sell, and the substantial dicta evidencing the Court’s 
opinion that Sell was in fact a “dangerous” person, and the subsequent lower court 
treatments of the dangerous issue, it is clear that whether a person is considered 
dangerous will be fatal in fact to that person’s liberty interest to stay free of 
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs.143   
B.  State Interest Provides Second Loophole 
One of the most glaring questions to be answered in subsequent litigation, then, is 
whether the Harper rational review with bite test or Sell’s heightened scrutiny test is 
the proper one to apply.  As shown earlier, the presence of a dangerousness element 
in the defendant could likely render this point moot, but beyond that assumption, an 
argument could be made that the determining factor for the court to weigh is what 
the state interest is.  Harper involved penological interests, which have been said to 
override even fundamental liberty interests.144  When, like in Sell, the state is simply 
trying to administer the drugs to meet the state interest of adjudication of a non-
violent criminal case, the importance of their interest may diminish.  Conversely, if 
the state seeks to prosecute an individual for the commission of violent felonies, its 
interest in adjudication may grow with stature. 
This distinction in classes or seriousness of crimes ultimately provides another 
loophole for forced administration of antipsychotic medications, one that goes 
around an absence of dangerousness finding.  This difference in state interest gives 
further weight to the possibility of the state administering antipsychotic medication 
to a defendant based on the severity of his charges.  Sell specifically applied only to 
non-violent offenses, but it is easy to conceive how the government may in the future 
seek to administer antipsychotic medication to an individual who poses no threat or 
danger, but is being charged with a violent offense, such as murder, burglary, or 
rape.  Under the analysis applied in Riggins and Sell, adjudication of this serious 
offense would be a much more important governmental interest than would 
adjudication of fraud and money laundering charges.145    This distinction between 
                                                                
143In the case of the two lower court opinions cited (see Kourey, 276 F.Supp.2d 580, and 
Colon, 2003 WL 21730603), the fact that administration of the drugs did not happen does not 
contradict this conclusion, since both courts found that administration of the drugs was 
permissible based on the fact that each individual was dangerous.  Therefore, even though the 
defendant’s liberty interests were not immediately violated, the circumstances could very well 
change in each case, if more extensive findings were gathered or the person failed to comply 
with all the details of the court’s instructions for accepting the medication.  In either instance, 
it is easy to conceive how the person’s liberty interest can be violated, and, therefore, that 
interest has no greater protection before Sell than it does after, once that dangerous finding has 
been made.   
144Harper, 494 U.S. at 223 (citing the progeny of penological interests cases). 
145See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135-36 (“[T]he State might have been able to justify medically 
appropriate, involuntary treatment with the drug by establishing that it could not obtain an 
adjudication of Riggins’ guilt or innocence by using less intrusive means”) (citing Illinois v. 
Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
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violent and non-violent offenses simply draws another line in the sand by which the 
state may be able to deprive the individual of his significant liberty interest.  It is 
easy to imagine that such a case will find its way on to the Court’s docket soon 
enough. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Sell, the Supreme Court added a layer of protection for individuals faced with 
a serious threat to their significant liberty interest in remaining free of unwanted 
medication.  However, the layer is thin at best.  By distinguishing between dangerous 
and non-dangerous individuals, the Court leaves a gaping loophole through which 
the government will be able to violate protected interests.  Upon a mere showing of 
dangerousness, lower courts will apply the comparatively deferential Harper test 
instead of the articulated Sell test.  Moreover, the definition of “dangerousness” 
includes those who pose a threat to others or themselves.  This leads to the risk that a 
showing of dangerousness may easily be met because the government, by definition, 
would not be seeking to forcibly administer the antipsychotic medication absent 
some mental disease, and those individuals may easily be found to pose a threat to 
themselves.  Once this showing has been made, lower courts will be free to order 
forced administration of the antipsychotic drugs in violation of the defendant’s 
significant liberty interest to remain free of those drugs.   
Further, even if this showing cannot be made, the Court leaves open the question 
whether such forced administration may even be constitutionally permissible to meet 
a more significant government interest than adjudication of fraud charges, such as 
adjudication of a violent offense, such as murder.  Instead of leaving these answers 
uncertain and providing only a thin layer of protection, the Court should have 
adopted the clear-cut strict scrutiny standard in all forcible administration of 
antipsychotic medication cases.  Absent the adoption of this standard in all instances, 
certainly the Court should have adopted that standard when penological interests are 
not involved.  Instead, the Court’s treatment of these issue leaves open many 
questions which will have to be addressed another day, while in the meantime scores 
of defendants’ significant liberty interests in remaining free from unwanted 
antipsychotic medication will be violated.        
GREGG SINGLE 
 
